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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a provably secure way for two distant parties to establish a common secret
key, which then can be used in a classical cryptographic scheme. Using quantum entanglement, one can reduce the
necessary assumptions that the parties have to make about their devices, giving rise to device-independent QKD
(DIQKD). However, in all existing protocols to date the parties need to have an initial (at least partially) random
seed as a resource. In this work, we show that this requirement can be dropped. Using recent advances in the fields
of randomness amplification and randomness expansion, we demonstrate that it is sufficient for the message the
parties want to communicate to be (partially) unknown to the adversaries – an assumption without which any type
of cryptography would be pointless to begin with. One party can use her secret message to locally generate a secret
sequence of bits, which can then be openly used by herself and the other party in a DIQKD protocol. Hence, our
work reduces the requirements needed to perform secure DIQKD and establish safe communication.
1 Introduction
Within the advancing quantum information technologies, quantum key distribution (QKD) is arguably the techno-
logically most advanced field and has already entered the market with working product solutions. In this quantum
cryptographic protocol, two parties usually named Alice and Bob exploit the laws of quantum physics to produce a
shared random key that remains unknown to the rest of the world and which can then be used as a one-time pad in a
classical cryptographic scheme [1–4].
The security of entanglement-based QKD protocols relies on the violation of a Bell inequality [5] using pairs of
quantum entangled particles shared by Alice and Bob. Remarkably, it has been shown that such entanglement-based
protocols allow device-independent QKD (DIQKD) [6, 7], in which the two parties need not make any assumptions
about the inner workings of their devices, in particular the source that produces the systems which the parties measure
as well as their own measurement devices. In principle, the measurement apparatuses can be bought from an untrusted
party, the eavesdropper Eve, and the particle pair source can even be operated by her (as long as, for example, there
are no hidden transmitters in the devices). Alice and Bob can still extract a secret key by sufficiently violating a Bell
inequality. However, they are required to have access to a certain amount of randomness which they use for their
setting choices [8, 9]. This is related to the fact that no Bell inequality can be derived without the ”freedom-of-choice
assumption” [10].
For long messages, Alice and Bob need many settings to produce a key long enough, such that it becomes infea-
sible to invent their own random sequences bit by bit out of their heads. Hence, their settings need to be produced
by some sort of fast device. Such a random number generator and its corresponding randomness must be considered
a resource in the protocol. However, it is impossible to verify that any given random number generator is not de-
termined by some underlying mechanism which is simply unknown to the user but not to the eavesdropper. Clearly,
Alice and Bob should not buy their randomness generators from Eve. Therefore, in some sense, the assumptions in
DIQKD are contradictory. While one does not trust the measurement devices, one trusts the random number genera-
tors used for the setting choices. Recent developments (e.g. regarding the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random
Bit Generator) have shown that this trust can be problematic [11].
It is indeed possible to reduce the amount of required initial randomness via randomness amplification and ex-
pansion. These protocols exploit quantum correlations also in a device-independent way [12–17]. The former field
studies how, given a source of imperfect randomness which is partially correlated to the external world, one can
produce a short string which is completely uncorrelated and safe. The latter studies how, given a finite amount of
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perfect random bits one can produce a longer (potentially unbounded) random bit string. Both of these processes have
been generalized recently to achieve unbounded random strings from finite min-entropy sources [15, 16]. However,
both protocols require an initial (at least partially) random seed, and there is no apparent way of getting around this
assumption if one wants to stick to the device-independent scenario.
We define a completely DIQKD (CDIQKD) protocol to be one which is not only device-independent regarding
the measurement apparatuses and the pair source but which also does not need to make any assumptions about the
setting generators or initial random seeds. It seems that this is an impossible task. The QKD community has been
working within the paradigm that if not at least one of the parties does not have an initial (at least partially) random
source, then sending safe messages is not feasible.
In this paper, however, we show that the obstacle is surmountable and that CDIQKD is indeed possible. The
solution lies in the observation that Alice and Bob do not really need their settings to be random with respect to the
whole universe. They only need randomness with respect to Eve. Therefore, having a string which is random to
Eve and the devices used in the protocol is sufficient, even though the string is not random with respect to an honest
party like Alice. And there is one thing, which is random to Eve due to the fundamental underlying assumption in
cryptography: the message X which Alice wants to send to Bob. Without this trivial assumption – so basic that it
usually is not even mentioned –, there is no reasonable cryptographic task in the first place.
Our procedure seems counter-intuitive and risky, but in this paper we give a proof of principle that it is secure. In
the following, we will show that Alice can use her secret message to locally generate a secret sequence of bits, which
can then be used by herself and Bob as the settings in an entanglement-based QKD protocol.
2 Background and Assumptions
We will work with the standard QKD assumptions which, for the sake of clarity, are listed below.
Quantum Key Distribution Assumptions:
1. Shielding. A no-signaling condition is imposed on the components of each device, as well as between devices in
both parties’ laboratories.
2. Authenticated classical communication channel between parties. This is not assumed to be secure, i.e. any classical
communication is accessible to Eve. Furthermore, we consider this authenticated channel to be available to the
parties as a black box resource, that was for instance previously established using a secret key.
3. Restriction to quantum theory. The adversary can only prepare devices following the laws of quantum mechanics.
In particular, she does not possess arbitrary no-signaling devices.
4. Message with randomness. Alice possess a message X with k min-entropy with respect to Eve and the devices,
and can estimate this value. k needs to be sufficiently large.
These are the fundamental assumptions, without any of which the protocol could not guarantee security. For
example, without assumption 1, there could be a transmitter in the devices telling Eve everything that is going on
in the laboratories (including the secret message), or Eve could manipulate the devices externally. Furthermore, the
protocols work assuming a Bell inequality was violated for which the components of the physical devices must not
communicate, which for example, could be enforced by a spacelike separation. Assumption 2 is needed to avoid
the “Man in the Middle” attack, even though this classical channel is accessible to the adversary. In the present
work we consider the channel as a black box resource, see the Discussion for an elaboration. Assumption 3 may
seem restrictive at a mathematically fundamental level, but this is also a standard assumption for security proofs
such as in [7, 15, 16, 18], since super-quantum correlations have not been observed experimentally. Finally, our main
assumption is that Alice’s message X has some conditional min-entropy with respect to Eve and the devices, and that
Alice is able to estimate this value. We argue that this is a sound assumption (and indeed usually left implicit), since
if the message was not at least partially random to Eve, then performing a QKD protocol would lose all its point to
begin with, as was already suggested in the concluding remark of [19].
In this article, we think of conditional min-entropy Hmin operationally. If we have the classical quantum state
ρXE = ∑x PX(x)∣x⟩⟨x∣ ⊗ ρxE , classical over X and quantum over E, then the probability that party E correctly
guesses the value of the random variable X is:
pguess(X ∣E) =∑
x
PX(x)tr[FxρxE] = 2−Hmin(X ∣E)ρ
2
where {Fx} is the optimal POVM on E [20]. In words, this means that the min-entropy quantifies how much of the
string X is unknown to system E. This is the standard way of quantifying randomness, by which we mean how much
of a variable is unpredictable to a third party. In that sense, the “most random variable” X corresponds to the uniform
distribution UX which is completely independent from everything else. In that case the min-entropy is simply the
number of random bits, Hmin(X ∣E) = ∣X ∣.
By Randomness Extractors Ext(k, ε), we refer to deterministic algorithms, which take a source X with min-
entropy k, together with a uniform random seed of length d, to produce an output of length m, which is an ε-distance
from the uniform distribution. We shall use Trevisan’s extractor [21], which was proven to be secure against quantum
adversaries in [18], following the works of [22, 23]. See Appendix B, for a rigorous treatment.
A powerful observation which we will also need is the Equivalence Lemma from [16]. The lemma states that the
security of protocols using perfectly random strings depends on these strings being perfectly random to the devices,
and requiring perfect randomness to both the devices and the adversaries is not necessary. This is formally stated
in the appendix as Lemma A.1. Since we are assuming that Eve doesn’t signal to the devices, the important thing
then is that the devices are not preprogrammed to receive certain inputs. If during the protocol Eve learns more about
what random seeds Alice and Bob will use, then even if she adapts her eavesdropping strategy she cannot gain any
advantage, so long as the devices were distributed beforehand.
Chung, Shi, and Wu devised a protocol which can amplify any finite source with min-entropy k, by using Tre-
visan’s Extractors Ext(k, ε) [16]. They coined this procedure Physical Randomness Extraction, because they rely on
physical procedures which extract randomness in a secure manner through Bell tests. Their solution is to use Ext(k, ε)
on the min-entropy source with all 2d possible seed strings of length d, and feeding each hashed output to different im-
plementations of the physical extraction protocol (which here will be a randomness expansion protocol). By different
implementations, we mean using new devices on each run of the physical protocol as to guarantee each input is really
random with respect to the devices to be used (i.e. there aren’t any memory correlations between implementations).
See the first part of Figure 1.
For expansion, we will use the recent protocol by Miller and Shi [15] (abbreviated as MS), which by itself gives
cryptographic security in the output and is robust to noise. This protocol, together with the Equivalence Lemma can
take a min-entropy source and produce unbounded expansion with only 2 untrusted devices. Following [15, 16] we
treat a device D as a black box, with which the experimenter can interact classically. Each box D will consist of t
spatially separated (no-signaling) components which will play an XOR non-local game. Hence, the number t will
depend on the nonlocal game to be played (e.g. for CHSH t = 2, and for GHZ t = 3). See [24] for an exposition on
XOR games.
Currently, different DIQKD schemes exist that could work with our protocol. Choosing which one to implement
is a matter of taste, since different Bell inequalities have different advantages. For example, the protocols [7, 15] are
robust against a constant fraction of noise, while [25] is even safe against no-signaling adversaries. What is common
in these schemes though, is that at least one of the parties must have access to an additional source of randomness.
Given that we would like our CDIQKD protocol to be noise tolerant, we propose to use one of [7, 15]. To our
knowledge, these are the only available protocols which are secure against quantum adversaries, possessing quantum
side information.
The last concepts we need to introduce are the security parameters. The completeness error εc bounds the proba-
bility that we reject an honest implementation of the protocol, P[Reject] ≤ εc. The soundness error εs quantifies how
random the output Z is if we choose to accept it. To see how, consider general output states which are decomposed as
Φ ○ΓE[ρ] = ∣Acc⟩⟨Acc∣⊗σAccZXDE + ∣Rej⟩⟨Rej∣⊗σRejZXDE , where Φ is the quantum channel of the protocol, and ΓE is
an arbitrary quantum channel on Eve’s system. We require that there exists a state ξ such that ξAccZXE = UZ ⊗ ξXE and∣∣σAccZXE − ξAccZXE ∣∣ ≤ εs . Here, σAccZXE is the subnormalized output after tracing out the devices D, and UZ = 1∣Z∣1 is the
uniform distribution. Most of the time though, we will just talk about the security parameter δ = max(εc, εs), which
represents the worst error in both possible interpretations of the word error.
The error tolerance parameter, or noise level, η, parametrizes how an actual implementation of an untrusted
device deviates from an honest one. That is, it is the maximum ratio of game rounds for which we observe an error
(so that the observed correlations are not according to the optimal winning strategy).
3 Key Distribution Protocol
For convenience, we divide our CDIQKD protocol into two parts: Randomness Processing and Key Distribution. The
randomness processing part (which takes place entirely in Alice’s laboratory) consists of taking Alice’s message X
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S0 = 0 . . .00
Ext(k, ε) W0 MS Expansion Z0
S1 = 0 . . .01
Ext(k, ε) W1 MS Expansion Z1
S2 = 0 . . .10
X Ext(k, ε) W2 MS Expansion Z2 Z =⊕Zi
⋮ ⋮⋮ ⋮
S2d−1 = 1 . . .11
Ext(k, ε) W2d−1 MS Expansion Z2d−1
DIQKD
Randomness Processing Protocol
1
Figure 1: (Color online) Schematic Representation of the Protocol. An n-bit Message X is fed into Trevisan’s Extractor with
all possible seeds S of length d, which in turn is used to run the Miller-Shi protocol for expansion. Finally, these outputs are
summed (modulus 2) to obtain the random seed Z used for the DIQKD scheme.
Figure 2: (Color online) Representation of the MS Expansion protocol, used within the Randomness Processing Protocol. By
cross feeding the outputs of the devices to each other, Alice is able to obtain the unbounded random string Z.
as a seed to create a string of random numbers Z which will be used in the Key Distribution Scheme (e.g. to choose
measurement bases, which bits to compare and test the Bell inequality on, or which hashing function to use).
Randomness Processing Protocol:
1. Alice lists all possible bit strings (S0, S1, . . . , S2d−1) of length d.
2. Alice processes her message X with Trevisan’s extractor, using all 2d strings Si as possible seeds. Call the outputs
Wi = Ext[X , Si].
3. Alice performs the MS unbounded randomness expansion protocol in parallel, on each Wi, and using different
devices. The output of each expansion run is labeled Zi.
4. Z =⊕iZi
The actual size of d = ∣Si∣ and m = ∣Wi∣ are specified in the next section.
The randomness processing protocol to be used, is the composition of the protocols proposed by [16] and [15], as
is depicted in Figure 1. The ideal objective of the protocol is to obtain a random string Z , independent from the input
message X , such that ∣Z ∣ ≫ ∣X ∣. In fact, the expansion protocol used allows us to make the output Z unbounded, so
that Alice can be confident she will have enough random bits to feed the DIQKD protocol.
The MS-expansion protocol uses the concatenation of two devices to achieve unbounded randomness expansion
[15]. As seen in Figure 2, an input random string X0 is fed into the first device and produces an output string X1
which is longer and contains more min-entropy than the input. Then, stringX1 is fed into the second device, producing
output X2 which is also longer and contains more min-entropy than its corresponding input X1. In this fashion, it is
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Figure 3: (Color online) Space-time scheme of a QKD protocol without initial randomness. From her secret message X , Alice
has already established a sequence Z of bits zi unknown to Eve. Eve sequentially sends pairs of particles labeled with 2i− 1 and
2i (i = 1,2, . . .) to Alice and Bob, respectively. Once Bob confirms he received particle 2i, Alice sends the bit z2i to Bob, which
he uses as a setting. Alice uses z2i−1 for her own particle.
easily seen that alternating between the two devices, the random strings {Xj} keep prolonging monotonically, and
Alice is free to repeat this protocol as many times as possible to achieve unbounded expansion.
One may note however that in between device uses, the output must be processed through Trevisan’s extractor,
which provides security against quantum side information. Since the extractor requires two inputs, in reality not all of
string Xj is fed into a device. Rather a part of it is kept to seed the extractor, which will operate on the raw expanded
output of the device. Afterwards, Alice may choose to run the expansion on the whole string Xj+1, or directly use
some of the bits as an output sequence (as depicted in Figure 2).
The specific expansion protocol used to obtain the longer and more random output Xj+1, from the shorter input
Xj is given in Appendix C. For the moment, let’s assume that Alice is running the protocol based on the GHZ non-
local game, and that the size of her desired output is N = ∣Xj+1∣. Then, Alice will feed N different inputs into
the components of her device which are in charge of violating the GHZ-Bell inequality. The majority of the time
Alice will use a predefined input for her device’s components (say 111), and record the output of the first component
(these are the so-called generating rounds). However, in order to be sure that the components are indeed outputting
random strings, Alice needs to run statistical tests on her device. For this, she will select a random subset of the N
inputs to actually “play” the GHZ game – i.e. the inputs to the device components are chosen at random from the
set {111,100,010,001}. The GHZ game is won if a1 ⊕ a2 ⊕ a3 = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 , where the ai are the output of
the components, and the xi the corresponding inputs. If during these game rounds, the device loses more often than
allowed by the error tolerance parameter (optimized later), then Alice aborts. Otherwise, she now has a new random
string Xj+1 which has more min-entropy than what she started with.
Finally, Alice will have a fully secret string Z with respect to Eve. If the security of the string is high enough,
this can be used to implement the now standard protocols of [7, 26] or even the new QKD protocol of [15]. However,
it is typically assumed that both Alice and Bob have access to RNG’s or initial randomness. Now, only Alice has
randomness available, and she must publicly broadcast to Bob what to measure. One way for this to be secure, would
be to require that Alice and Bob were already sharing all entangled pairs from the start. A way around this would
be for Alice to wait until Bob has received his device (i.e. part of the entangled pair), and afterwards Alice would
broadcast Bob’s corresponding measurement setting (see Figure 3). This eliminates the need of the vast quantum
memory of the former approach. What is needed is that there exist quantum states and measurement settings such that
each step in the protocol would be passed by honest parties, which both approaches possess.
4 Security Analysis
In this section we analyze the security of the protocol. Our starting point is that Alice holds a message of length n
that she wants to communicate to Bob, and said message has min-entropy k (conditioned on Eve and the devices).
For the protocol to work, it is part of the assumption that Alice can estimate (lower bound) the value k, which is also
a commonly implied assumption in other protocols such as [12, 15, 16].
Of course all of the sub-protocols we are utilizing here have been proven secure by their corresponding authors,
but their composition is a non-trivial task. Also, the point of view we take here is that Alice has no further access to
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randomness, so there will be a lower bound for the security parameters (since these are functions of k, and it is finite).
We also note that since this is a proof of principle, the requirement of exponentially many different devices that arises
from the scheme of Chung, Shi, and Wu is something we do not intend to improve, and we rest content with having a
finite amount of devices.
The first part we analyze is Trevisan’s Extractor, proven to be secure against quantum adversaries [18, 21–23].
This will create an output of size m < k an εT -distance from uniform. The following Lemma gives a bound on the
error and seed length needed. For an explicit and detailed proof, see Appendix B.
Lemma 4.1. Trevisan’s Extractor
For a message X with min-entropy k, 0 < m < k, there exists an m-bit quantum proof extractor Ext(k, εT ), using a
seed of length
d = (7 + k −m + log ∣X ∣)2 log(4m)
ln 2
(4.1)
and with error
εT = 3m2− 18 (k−m)+ 14 . (4.2)
For analyzing the security of Miller and Shi’s expansion protocol, we must choose a nonlocal game to be played.
In what follows we shall use the GHZ game, with t = 3. Besides having a large quantum-classical gap and having
an optimal strategy that wins with probability 1, both [15, 27] have considered it for their analysis. Concretely, there
exist carefully optimized parameters to implement the Miller-Shi unbounded protocol with a uniform seed, such that
the security parameter decreases exponentially with the seed length m:
εMS = 2α−mβ , (4.3)
with constants β= 31328, and α = 120,931. See Appendix C for further details.
It is interesting to note that while the expansion error εMS decreases exponentially with the input length m, the
error of the quantum proof extractor grows exponentially with the output size m. Hence, there is a direct trade off,
and Alice must choosem accordingly to her error goals in an easy optimization problem. For simplicity though, Alice
can take e.g. m = k/2.
Finally, Chung, Shi, and Wu’s main result gives the soundness and completeness errors one obtains after having
performed extraction and expansion with each of the 2d seeds and summing all of the outputs modulo 2. The answer
is a function of both the extraction and expansion error, as well as the error tolerance η, which comes from the Miller-
Shi expansion protocol. In particular, the security parameter δ of the whole randomness processing protocol will be
given by δ = max ( εT+εMSη , εMS + 2√εT + 2η), using a total of 6 ⋅ 2d device components [16]. This leads us to our
first main result (proof in Appendix D).
Theorem 4.1. Security of Randomness Processing
If Alice performs the Randomness Processing Protocol on her message X with min-entropy k, the output string Z is
cryptographically secure. That is, the security parameter δ is exponentially small in k.
It is worth noting that there is some threshold value for this protocol k ⪆ 200,000, under which it will not work
at all. This is reminiscent of the 225,000 bits of min-entropy that are needed to have unbounded expansion with the
MS-protocol and a security parameter of  = 10−1 [27]. That is, in order to achieve a fixed security parameter target
for randomness expansion, the amount of input min-entropy must be above some threshold. In any case, we imagine
k to be large enough so that the security parameter is sufficiently small.
Now that Alice has the random stringZ , she is ready to apply, together with Bob, the DIQKD protocol of either [7]
or [15], which have their respective errors εc, εs. For a moment let us assume that Z is a perfectly random string,
then the Equivalence Lemma of [16] would guarantee that the completeness and soundness errors of the DIQKD
protocol would remain the same even if Eve learned most of Z later on (making this semantically secure). However,Z has security parameter δ, exponentially small in k, and this will add to the errors of the protocol (which could be
understood as a consequence of the composability of the protocols [28]). Note that the string Z is indeed random to
the devices in the DIQKD protocol, since the initial message had min-entropy k =Hmin(X ∣ED) conditioned on both
the randomness processing devices D, and Eve (who is the one who potentially will create the DIQKD devices). We
formalize this in our second main theorem, which is proven in Appendix E.
Theorem 4.2. Security of CDIQKD
Let there be a DIQKD protocol which requires a perfect Random Number Generator and which has completeness and
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soundness errors (εc, εs). Then, Alice can perform the Randomness Processing Protocol on her secret message X
with min-entropy k, to produce a secure random output Z and perform CDIQKD with errors (εc + δ, εs + δ), where
δ = 2−Ω(k).
5 Discussion
We have shown that even in the absence of randomness generators, Alice can securely perform DIQKD. This is
indeed a remarkable fact, since it is commonly assumed that without initial randomness no security can be achieved.
In this article, we have made a proof of principle based on the assumptions given. Note however, that our protocol
still required the use of a classical authenticated channel which traditionally is established using a shared secret key
between the honest parties. At first sight this seems to call into question the result of this paper. However remark that
the authenticated channel does not have to be established each time the parties wish to send a message to each other. As
stated in Assumption 2, we consider the authenticated channel to be a black box resource, that the parties could have
established a long time in the past. A shared arbitrarily weak key suffices for this task, as shown in [29]. Traditional
DIQKD relies on a further assumption, namely that the parties hold private secure random number generators, which
they use to obtain inputs for the protocol. The security of the output randomness of these RNGs could be subject
to question especially if these were prepared by an external adversary. The issue this paper addresses is therefore
the removal of this crucial assumption in a fairly general framework for DIQKD. Finally, a secret key shared by the
parties could replace the message in the presented protocol if it is of sufficiently high min-entropy.
We leave further generalizations and optimizations for future work. For example, we conjecture that our scheme
can be simplified to use a significantly smaller number of devices and that it can be generalized to be secure against
no-signaling adversaries also, leading to drop the validity of quantum mechanics as an assumption.
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Appendix
A Definitions and Notation
In this section, we formalize some important definitions, which were just mentioned conceptually in the main text.
Throughout this whole article, as is common in information science, log(x) = log2(x).
Definition A.1. Conditional Min-Entropy
Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB), the min-entropy of A conditioned on B is:
Hmin(A∣B)ρAB = max{λ ∈R ∶ ∃ σB ∈ D(HB) s.t. ρAB ≤ 2−λ1A ⊗ σB} (A.1)
Here,D(H) represents the set of density matrices in Hilbert spaceH. For the completeness and soundness errors,
we use the definitions given by [16], since our security parameter is based on the maximum of these quantities. Before
that, we must specify what is meant by a physical system.
Definition A.2. Physical System [16]
A physical system S is defined on an arbitrarily large, but finite Hilbert space X ⊗D ⊗E, with a classical source X
of length n with k min-entropy, t untrusted devices D = (D1, . . . ,Dt), and an adversary E. To each device Di there
corresponds a quantum interactive algorithm ADi that applies on Di which outputs at most m bits.
Usually this is also called an (n, k, t,m)-Physical Source, where in our scenario the min-entropy k the message
has is conditioned on both E and D. Hence, a physical system S is specified by a state ρXDE and the algorithms the
devices will follow {ADi}, but the latter are usually irrelevant for the security analysis.
Any randomness processing protocol (e.g. for amplification or expansion) can be viewed as a quantum channel
Φ ∶ D(X⊗D)→ D(O⊗Z⊗X⊗D), also called Physical Randomness Extractors (since they act on physical systems).
The new Hilbert spaces O ⊗Z are for a decision bit o which will tell us to accept or reject the implementation of the
protocol (if e.g. the Bell test was not passed with confidence), and the new output random string Z . If the physical
randomness extractors require perfectly random inputs, i.e. they are designed to work on (n,n, t,m)-physical systems,
they are called Seeded Physical Randomness Extractors.
Definition A.3. Completeness Error [16]
There exist honest devices D = (D1, . . . ,Ds) with internal state σD and algorithms {ADi}, with each device out-
putting at most m bits such that for any (n, k, s,m)-physical system S satisfying trXE[ρ] = ρD = σD, we have
P[Acc(ρ)] ≥ 1 − εc (A.2)
Where Acc(ρ) denotes the event that the protocol accepts on the input state of the device and source supplied to the
physical randomness extractor, when applied to S, (i.e. o = Acc).
In other words, this tells us that if we are using honest devices, we will accept the protocol with high probability.
The soundness error, in turn tells us how close we are to a truly random output (i.e. a uniform distribution), conditioned
on accepting the protocol.
Definition A.4. Soundness Error [16]
Suppose the physical system S is equipped with a decision bit O, then the projection of the output Φ[ρ] to the
Acceptance subspace is at most an εs distance away from a state of the form UZ ⊗ ξXE conditioned on accepting,
where ξXE is some classical quantum state. General output states are decomposed as Φ ○ ΓE[ρ] = ∣Acc⟩⟨Acc∣ ⊗
σAccZXDE + ∣Rej⟩⟨Rej∣ ⊗ σRejZXDE , where ΓE is an arbitrary quantum channel on Eve’s system. We require that there
exists a state ξ such that ξAccZXE = UZ ⊗ ξXE and∣∣σAccZXE − ξAccZXE ∣∣ ≤ εs (A.3)
Where σAccZXE is the subnormalized output after tracing out device D, and UZ = 1∣Z∣1 is the uniform distribution.
An important result which we will need for our analysis, which has to do with physical randomness extractors, is
the following lemma:
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Lemma A.1. Equivalence Lemma [16]
Let Φ be a seeded physical randomness extractor, with seeds X which are perfectly random to both Eve and the
Devices (i.e. Hmin(X ∣DE) = n), have parameters (εs, εc, η). Then the same physical randomness extractor Φ, when
applied to an input which is perfectly random to just the devices (i.e. Hmin(X ∣D) = n) will have the same parameters(εs, εc, η).
The moral being, that the crucial thing is that the input is random to the devices used.
B Quantum Strong Extractors
In this section, we analyze the security of Trevisan’s extractor from reference [18], to prove Lemma 4.1. We begin
with a formal definition of a quantum-strong extractor.
Definition B.1. Quantum Proof Strong Extractor
Ext:{0,1}n × {0,1}d → {0,1}m , is an m-bit quantum proof (k, ε)-strong extractor, if for all states ρXE classical on
X with Hmin ≥ k, and a uniform seed Y of length d, we have:
1
2
∣∣ρExt(X,Y )Y E −Um ⊗ ρy ⊗ ρE ∣∣ ≤ ε (B.1)
With ∣∣ ⋅ ∣∣ the trace-norm, and Um the totally mixed state in C2m .
The classical version of this definition ignores the quantum state E and uses the variational distance in equation
(B.1). Explicitly, a (k, ε)-strong extractor satisfies 12 ∣∣Ext(X,Y )○Y −Um ○Y ∣∣ ≤ ε. The main theorem of [18] relates
the security of 1 bit (k, ε)-strong extractors to m-bit extractors which are quantum proof. This is done via means of
weak (t, r)-designs, which are just families of partioning sets – otherwise irrelevant here.
Theorem B.1. Trevisan’s Extractor is Quantum Proof (Theorem 4.6 of [18])
Let C ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}t → {0,1} be a (k, ε)-strong extractor with uniform seed and S1, ..., Sm ⊂ [d], a weak (t, r)-
design. Then ∃ an extractor ExtC ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}d → {0,1}m, which is a (k + rm + log(1/ε),3m√ε)-quantum
proof strong extractor.
The existence of such weak designs is given by [22].
Lemma B.1. Existence of weak (t,1)-designs (Lemma 17 of [22])∀t,m ∈ N,∃ weak (t,1)-design S1, ..., Sm ⊂ [d] such that d = t⌈ tln 2⌉⌈log(4m)⌉. Furthermore such a weak-design
can be found in Poly(m,d) time and Poly(m) space.
For the 1-bit extractor C, we will use list-decodable codes -again, for our purposes all we require is their existence
and that they can be found efficiently. This was implicitly proven by [21, 22], and explicitly stated in [18] Theorem
C.3.
Lemma B.2. List Decodable Codes are 1-bit Extractors (Theorem C.3 of [18])
Let C ∶ {0,1}n → {0,1}n¯ be an (ε,L)-list decodable code. Then ∃ ExtC ∶ {0,1}n × [n¯] → {0,1}, which is a(logL + log ( 12ε) ,2ε)-strong extractor, created from code C.
Finally, we need an existence theorem for list decodable codes.
Lemma B.3. Existence of List Decodable Codes (Lemma C.2 of [18], Theorem 24 of [30])∀n ∈ N, and ε > 0, ∃ a code Cn,ε ∶ {0,1}n → {0,1}n¯ which is (ε,1/ε2) list decodable. Furthermore n¯ can be
assumed to be a power of 2, and satisfies the bound n¯ ≤ 32n/ε4. The code Cn,ε can be evaluated in Poly(n,1/ε) time.
With all of this in mind, we are ready to prove Lemma 4.1. This is an analogous result to Corollary 5.3 of [18],
and [27] has also made a similar analysis.
Lemma B.4. (Lemma 4.1 from main text)
For a message X with k min-entropy, m < k, there exists an m-bit quantum proof extractor Ext(k, εT ), using a seed
of length
d = (7 + k −m + log ∣X ∣)2 log(4m)
ln 2
(B.2)
and with error
εT = 3m2− 18 (k−m)+ 14 . (B.3)
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Existence of List Decodable Codes∀n ∈N, ε1 > 0∃ Cn,ε1 ∶ {0,1}n → {0,1}n¯
a (ε1,1/ε21) list decodable code
with n¯ ≤ 32n
ε41
.
List Decodable Codes as Extractors
Let Cn,ε2 ∶ {0,1}n → {0,1}n¯
be an (ε2, L) list decodable code. Then,∃ ExtCn,ε2 ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}log(n¯) → {0,1}
which is a (logL + log ( 1
2ε2
) ,2ε2)
strong extractor with uniform seed.
Existence of Weak (t,1)-Designs∀t,m ∈N,∃ weak (t,1)-design
S1, ..., Sm ⊂ [d] such that
d = t⌈ t
ln 2
⌉⌈log(4m)⌉.
Quantum Strong Extractors
Let ExtCn,ε3 ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}t → {0,1}
be a (k, ε3)-strong extractor
with uniform seed.
Let S1, ..., Sm ⊂ [d]
be a weak (t,1)-design. Then,∃ QExtCn,ε3 ∶ {0,1}n × {0,1}d → {0,1}m
a (k +m + log(1/ε3),3m√ε3) extractor
which is quantum proof.
1
Figure 4: Schematic diagram for the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Proof. Lemma 4.1
To facilitate the proof of this lemma, which involves many different concepts and parameters, we refer to Figure 4.
Notice that the notation is slightly different from the statement of the lemmas, to make it more consistent throughout
the proof.
We take n¯ to be a power of 2, n¯ = 2t. Next, we create a (δ,1/δ2) List-Decodable Code from Lemma B.3, so that
we are guaranteed the existence of a 1-bit (3 log ( 12δ)+2,2δ)-strong extractor C ∶ {0,1}n ×{0,1}t → {0,1}, with the
help of Lemma B.2. We consider the worst case (saturated) bound on n¯:
n¯ = 32n
δ4
→ t = log(25n
δ4
) (B.4)
Equipped with this 1-bit extractor, we shall now use Theorem B.1 to create an m-bit extractor which is quantum
proof. Direct application of the Theorem yields a (4 log ( 12δ)+m+2,3m√2δ)-quantum proof extractor. We want the
final error of the extractor to be ε, hence we take δ = ε2/(2⋅9m2), to get a quantum proof (8 log (mε )+m+2+8 log 3, ε)-
strong extractor. Now, in order for this extractor to work, we need the min-entropy of the input message to satisfy
k ≥ 8 log (mε )+m+2+8 log 3. Manipulating this inequality gives us the minimal error the output of the extractor can
have.
ε ≥ 3m2 2+m−k8 (B.5)
Finally, the t from Equation (B.2) is the same appearing in Lemma B.1, related to the (t,1) designs. Since we
are bounding the number of devices (and hence seed length), we will ignore the ceiling operators from Lemma
B.1, which in the limit of large t and m will be negligible. Hence, the seed length for Trevisan’s extractor will be
d = log2 (2938 nm8
ε8
) log(4m)ln 2 (having substituted in the value for δ). If now, we take the lowest bound from Equation
B.5 for the error ε we obtain
d = (7 + k −m + logn)2 log(4m)
ln 2
(B.6)
It is interesting to note that the error ε only depends on m and k, having a direct trade off between the available
min-entropy and how large of an output we desire. Meanwhile, d depends on all parameters but the term k −m has
opposite sign, showing qualitatively that the error and seed length are inversely related.
C Randomness Expansion
In this section, we explicitly analyze the protocol that we are using for expansion, namely the one given by Miller
and Shi [15]. In particular, we choose this protocol since it provides cryptographic security, i.e. the error parameters
are exponentially small and are negligible in the running time of the protocol. It also tolerates a constant level of
noise, where e.g. it was shown that any device which wins the GHZ game with probability at least 0.985 will achieve
exponential randomness expansion with probability approaching unity. Finally, and very important for us, with the
Equivalence Lemma (as given by [16]) this is able to produce unbounded expansion using only two devices – by
realizing that the expansion protocol is indeed a physical randomness extractor.
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In what follows, for simplicity, we will restrict the protocol to playing the GHZ game where the optimum quantum
strategy wins with probability 1, and will refer the readers to [15, 27] for the generic version.
The unbounded protocol, is just a concatenation of their one-shot protocol, so we provide the latter here. For that,
we need to define the variables needed: N ∈ N, is the output length, η ∈ (0, 12) the error tolerance, denoting how
much of a statistical error the components are allowed to make relative to the optimal winning strategy’s expectation,
and q ∈ (0,1) the test probability which denotes the chance a given round will be a game (Bell) round. The protocol
is then:
1. A bit g is chosen according to the distribution (1 − q, q).
2. If g = 1 (”game round”), then an input string from {111,001,010,100} is chosen at random to play the GHZ
game. If the GHZ game is won then output 0, else output 1 and record ”Failure” F .
3. If g = 0 (”generating round”), the string 111 is used as input on the device D = (D1,D2,D3). Record the
output of the first component D1.
4. Repeat steps 1–3, (N − 1) more times.
5. If the total number of failures F exceeds ηqN , the protocol Aborts. Otherwise, the protocol Succeeds, and the
output N -bit sequence is recorded.
In general, the one-shot protocol as given above can (for the right choice of parameters η, q,N ) provide an output
which is ε-close to having (1 − δ)N min-entropy for any choice of δ, and ε exponentially small as a function of N .
Gross and Aaronson have optimized over the parameters (η, q,N) and given a bound on the initial seed length needed
to get unbounded expansion [27]. In particular, they display a linear dependence on log(1/ε), giving the actual slope
to be β = 31328. Then, they state that the upper bound on seed length needed to get security of ε = 10−1 is 225,000.
From this, simple substitution gives α ≤ 120931, and hence Lemma 4.2. We note that they also give a bound of
715,000 bits needed to achieve ε = 10−6, but this gives a lower value of α (= 90,584), so we conservatively kept the
upper bound. For asymptotic statements, these constants are irrelevant so long they remain positive.
D Security of Randomness Processing
In this section, we follow the analysis of [16], to prove the security of our randomness processing protocol, as given
in Section 3 of the main text.
Hence for our analysis, the following theorem is crucial.
Theorem D.1. Chung-Shi-Wu Theorem [16]
Let 0 < η < 1 be the error tolerance parameter. Let X be an n-bit string with k min-entropy. Let Ext(k, εT ) ∶{0,1}n × {0,1}d → {0,1}m, be an m-bit quantum proof extractor, with seed length d. Let there be a protocol Φ (also
called physical randomness extractor), which takes a perfectly random seed of length m to produce an output random
string z, together with a decision bit , with completeness error εc and soundness error εs. If for every Si ∈ {0,1}d, we
perform Φ[Ext[X,Si]] = Zi, (Ext[X,Si] being Trevisan’s extractor applied on string X using seed Si), then the
protocol producing the output string Z =⊕Zi has:
Completeness Error εc+εTη
Soundness Error εs + 2√εT + 2η
provided less than an η-fraction of protocol Φ applications were rejected.
This is the exact form of the randomness processing protocol that we have given in the main text (Figure 1),
where Φ will be Miller and Shi’s unbounded expansion protocol. We will take the MS-expansion security parameter
εs = εc = εMS given by [27]. Here, we are still left with our errors as functions of m , k , and now (from the previous
theorem) η. To have a bound on the security parameter, we will find explicit functions for m and η, depending only
on Alice’s min-entropy k. We thus have all the ingredients to prove Theorem 4.1. We note however that since this
article focuses on a proof of principle, the following proof is done such that it is clear to follow at the expense of not
choosing the most optimum coefficient for the exponential decay in the security parameter.
Theorem D.2. Security of Randomness Processing (Theorem 4.1)
If Alice performs the Randomness Processing Protocol on her message X with min-entropy k, the output string Z is
cryptographically secure. That is, ∃ a constant γ > 0 such that the security parameter is δ = O (2−γk).
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Proof. Theorem 4.1
We begin by writing the error parameters that arise from the Trevisan Extractor as εT = c1m2−c2(k−m), and the one
from the Miller and Shi expansion protocol as εMS = c3 2−c4m, for some constants c1, c2, c3, c4. Where k is the min-
entropy of the message X , and m is both the output length of Trevisan’s Extractor, and the input size of the expansion
protocol. For simplicity, we shall take m = k/2, which yields as errors:
εT = c1
2
k 2− c22 k
εMS = c3 2− c42 k
From the Chung-Shi-Wu theorem D.1, we have that the security parameter δ = max ( εMS+εTη , εMS + 2√εT + 2η).
So we will take η = 2−αk, with a suitably chosen α. To make the security parameter as small as possible, we must
choose α large enough so it does not dominate the soundness error but we see that this will bring a trade-off with the
completeness error. In fact, from the completeness error, we have:
εMS + εT
η
= c1
2
k 2−( c22 −α)k + c3 2−( c42 −α)k
This requires that 2α < min(c2, c4). From the soundness error we have:
εMS + 2√εT + 2η = c3 2− c42 k +√2c1k 2− c24 k + 2 ⋅ 2−αk
From here, for the asymptotic statement, we see that we need a choice of α such that the expression
min ( c22 − α, c42 − α, c24 , c42 , α) is as big as possible, since those are the coefficients of the exponential decay. Using
our actual values for the constants c2 = 1/8 (from Lemma 4.1), and c4 = 1/31328 from [27], we see that the best is to
take α = c4/4 = 1/125312. This completes the proof of the theorem, with the security parameter as δ = O (2−γk) with
γ ≥ 1/125312 (since our choice of m < k was the simplest).
In fact, using the same values for the constants c2, c4, if we instead take m = 39163917k, and η = 2−k/62672, we can
get a better γ˜ = 1/62672, which is almost a factor 2 better than the exponent given in the theorem. Note further that
for asymptotic statements, for any ε,α > 0, we have poly(x)e−αx = O(e−(α−ε)x), so that we essentially ignore the
prefactors k and
√
k which appear in the proof.
E Security of CDIQKD
In this last section, we prove Theorem 4.2.
Theorem E.1. Security of CDIQKD (Theorem 4.2)
Let there be a DIQKD protocol which requires a perfect Random Number Generator, and has completeness and
soundness errors (εc, εs). Then, Alice can perform the Randomness Processing Protocol on her secret message X
with min-entropy k, to produce a secure random output Z and perform CDIQKD with errors (εc + δ, εs + δ), where
δ = 2−Ω(k).
Proof. Theorem 4.2
We need to check the security of the DIQKD protocol, given that Z is not perfectly random, but rather has an
exponentially small error, δ = 2−γk, for constant γ > 0. Let ρZXDE be the output state of the randomness processing
protocol (conditioned on accepting), then the soundness error just means that ∣∣ρZXDE − UZ ⊗ ρXDE ∣∣ ≤ δ, where D
refers to the devices of the DIQKD protocol.
Completeness: The DIQKD completeness error εc is calculated expecting perfect randomness in the protocol. Hence
P[Rej(UZ ⊗ ρXDE)] ≤ εc. Here Rej[ρ] denotes the event that the protocol rejects upon input ρ. This immediately
implies that P[Rej(ρZXDE)] ≤ εc + δ, since the trace norm operationally corresponds to the distinguishability of
states.
Soundness: Let Λ be the quantum channel of the DIQKD protocol which produces the shared keyY between Alice and
Bob, we write ΛAcc to denote the action of the quantum channel upon acceptance. Let ΛAcc[UZ ⊗ρXDE] = σAccY ZXDE ,
then the soundness error is given by ∣∣σAccY ZXE − UY ⊗ σAccZXE ∣∣ ≤ εs. From the contractivity of the trace norm under
quantum channels, we have ∣∣ΛAcc[ρZXDE]−ΛAcc[UZ ⊗ρXDE]∣∣ ≤ ∣∣ρZXDE −UZ ⊗ρXDE ∣∣ ≤ δ. And by the triangle
inequality, we have the new soundness error ∣∣ψAccY ZXE −UY ⊗ σAccZXE ∣∣ ≤ εs + δ, with ΛAcc[ρZXDE] = ψAccY ZXDE .
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